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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

GORDAN MASAGULUL PALELEI,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

Case No. 20000727-CA
Priority No. 2

ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MAKE THE
REQUISITE FACTUAL FINDINGS AND LEGAL CONCLUSIONS ON THE
RECORD IN SUPPORT OF ITS DETERMINATION THAT THE
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE IS RELIABLE.
The State contends that the trial court did not err in
failing to make the requisite factual findings and legal
conclusions in support of the determination that the eyewitness
identification evidence was constitutionally reliable and thus
admissible.

See State's Brief ("S.B.") Point I.B.

The State

incorrectly suggests that such findings may be assumed from the
record.1

S.B. 16-18.

The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219
1

The State cites State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah
1991), for the proposition that appellate courts may assume
factual findings from the record in support of a trial court's
decision to admit an identification if the evidence reasonably
supports it. See S.B. at 15 (citing Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 787-88
(quotations omitted)). Ramirez noted that findings may be
assumed in the context of a motion to suppress evidence seized
pursuant to a stop and seizure. 817 P.2d at 787-88. Ramirez did
not make a similar assertion in its discussion of the motion to
suppress the eyewitness identification. See id. 778-84.
Accordingly, Ramirez cannot be interpreted to mean that factual
findings in support of admitting eyewitness identification
evidence can be assumed from the record as the State suggests.

(Utah 1997), set forth three exceptions to the general rule that
factual findings may be assumed from the record when they are not
explicitly made by the trial court:
[(1)] the ambiguity of the facts makes this assumption
unreasonable, . . . [(2)] a governing statute
explicitly provides that the trial court must make
written findings of fact regarding a particular matter,
. . . [or (3)] this court has previously determined
that the trial court must make written findings on an
issue to assure that the materiality of the question is
impressed on the trial judge so as to enable this court
to perform properly its appellate review function.
Id. at 1224-25 (citations omitted).

Eyewitness identification

cases like the present one fit squarely under all three
exceptions.
First, "the ambiguity of the facts" that the trial court
below considered in admitting the identification evidence render
the assumption of supporting findings unreasonable.

Id. at 1224.

As discussed at length in Paleleifs opening brief ("A.B.") at
p.15-17, the record of the suppression hearing indicates that the
trial judge summarily ruled that the identification evidence was
admissible, stating only that, "I think [Pudil!s] identification
of the defendant when he walks in the door is sufficient,"
R.141[18], and "if [Davis] does identify [defendant] in court,
then I think youfve got a right to cross-examine him."
R.141[24].

There was no discussion of the facts in support of

that determination and no analysis of the Long reliability
factors, leaving ambiguity on appeal.

2

A.B. 15-17.

In the

absence of any articulated facts or analysis under Long, findings
may not be reasonably assumed.

See State v. Nelson, 950 P.2d

940, 944 (holding that findings could not reasonably be assumed
from record where trial court merely stated that identification
testimony was admissible because " f it ! s an issue of fact as to
whether or not the eyewitness is reliable1") (quoting suppression
hearing transcript).
Second, findings may not be assumed because Utah Rule of
Criminal Procedure 12(c) (2000), "a governing statute[,]
explicitly provides that the trial court must make written
findings of fact" in support of its decision to admit
identification evidence.

Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1224-25.

Rule

12(c) provides:
A motion made before trial shall be determined before
trial unless the court for good cause orders that the
ruling be deferred for later determination. Where

factual issues are involved in determining
the court shall state its findings on the
Utah R. Crim. P. 12(c) (emphasis added).

a motion,
record.

Rule 12(c) applies to

motions involving the admissibility of identification evidence
since the analysis involves a fact-specific inquiry under factors
set forth in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986).

See State

v. Nelson, 950 P.2d 940, 943-44 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (holding
that Utah R. Crim. P. 12(c) requires trial court to make record
findings in determining admissibility of eyewitness
identification evidence); see also Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 778-80

3

("[i]n determining admissibility, the trial court will be
required to resolve certain factual issues. . . . We will require
an in-depth appraisal of the identification's reliability along
the lines laid out by Long") . Accordingly, findings may not be
assumed since Rule 12(c) requires written findings on the record.
Finally, findings are required by this Court's opinion in
Nelson, 950 P.2d at 943-44.

See Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1225

(findings required if mandated by appellate court).

As noted in

Palelei's opening brief and supra. Nelson holds that Rule 12(c)
requires findings on the record in support of a trial courtfs
decision to admit eyewitness identification evidence.
15.

A.B. 13-

Hence, Nelson establishes the rule that a court must make

findings on the record regarding identification evidence pursuant
to Rule 12(c).

Findings, therefore, may not be properly assumed

in the context of a trial court's order to admit identification
evidence.
The State misleadingly asserts that Nelson does not "create
a rule requiring written findings."

S.B. 19.

The State cites to

dictum in the Nelson opinion wherein this Court rejected
appellee's argument that findings consistent with the decision to
admit identification evidence could be assumed from the record,
and makes the inference that findings may properly be assumed in
the present case.

Id. (citing Nelson, 950 P.2d at 944). The

State's argument does not rest on the actual holding of Nelson,

4

discussed supra.
Yet, even if Nelson stood for the proposition that findings
may be assumed in the eyewitness identification context, they
could not be inferred in the present case.

Like the trial court

in Nelson, assuming findings would not be appropriate because
the trial court [below] did not consider any evidence,
did not discuss the reliability factors, and made no
explicit determination of reliability. rSee supra &
A.B. 16-17 (discussing trial court's bare assertion as
to admissibility of identifications).] To assume the
facts and perform the reliability analysis on appeal
would eviscerate the Ramirez holding requiring that
trial courts, as gatekeepers, make the initial
determination as to admissibility.
Id. at 944.
In light of the foregoing and for the arguments set forth in
Palelei's opening brief Point I.A., the trial courtfs failure to
enter written findings of fact merits a new trial.

See Nelson,

950 P.2d at 944-45; Utah R. Crim. P. 12(c).
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ADEQUATELY INSTRUCT THE
JURY REGARDING EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE.
The State erroneously asserts that the eyewitness
identification instruction ("instruction") submitted by the trial
court adequately advised the jury as to the inherent weaknesses
of such evidence.

S.B. Point II.

The State contends, in part,

that the instruction is adequate although it fails to include
factors that may affect the reliability of an eyewitness
identification, "such as the distance of the witness from the
suspect, the length of time available to perceive the event, and
5

the amount of movement involved."

S.B. 24.

Quoting Long, the

State argues that such factors are "'rather obvious,f " S.B. 24
(quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 488), and that the "Long court was
more concerned with the less obvious considerations affecting the
capacity to observe."

Id. n.8 (citing Long, 721 P.2d at 488-89).

The State cites Long out of context.

Long notes that the

deleterious effects of distance, time, and movement upon an
eyewitness identification were "rather obvious" to underscore the
necessity of alerting a jury to their importance.
488.

721 P.2d at

Indeed, the Long opinion goes on to describe such factors

as "critical" to the reliability of an identification.

Id.

For these reasons, and the arguments set forth in Paleleifs
opening brief Point II, the trial court erred as a matter of law
in failing to adequately instruct the jury on the inherent
weaknesses of eyewitness identification evidence.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, and for the arguments set forth
in his opening brief2, Palelei respectfully requests this Court
to vacate his conviction and remand for a new trial on the basis
that the trial court erred as a matter of law failing to make the
requisite findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the
admissibility of the eyewitness identification evidence.

2

A new

Palelei submits on his opening brief in response to the
State's arguments not specifically addressed herein.

6

trial is also required where the court erroneously admitted
identification evidence that is not constitutionally reliable.
Alternatively, Palelei requests this Court to vacate his
conviction and remand for a new trial where the trial court
misinstructed the jury as to the law regarding eyewitness
identification evidence.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

£f&

day of March, 2001.
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